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The CFPB "Indirectly" Regulates Lending Through
Auto Dealers
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 21, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) signaled that auto finance would be an upcoming "fair lending
enforcement target"' in a Bulletin entitled Indirect Auto Lending and
Compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Bulletin).2 The
Bulletin announces CFPB concerns about a significant risk of pricing
disparities in auto finance based on factors prohibited by the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)3 from being considered in credit
extension decisions such as race and national origin.4
To date, the CFPB has pursued enforcement actions under the
Bulletin against at least four banks, including a settlement with Ally
Financial, Incorporated, and Ally Bank (collectively, "Ally").5
Regulatory filings by Toyota Motor Credit Company on September 13,
2013, and American Honda Finance Company on August 19, 2013,
disclosed that the CFPB and DOJ have also sought information from
them related to possible violations of the ECOA.6
1. Under Pressure: The CFPB and Auto Financing, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 11 (Dec.
17, 2013), http://www.pepperlaw.com/webinars update.aspx?ArticleKey=2797 [hereinafter
PEPPER HAMILTON].
2. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. No. 2013-02, INDIRECT
AUTO LENDING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT (2013),
available at http://files.consumerfmance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-
Bulletin.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN].
3. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2012).
4. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Mary Beth Hogan et al., The CFPB Issues Bulletin on Indirect Auto Lending and
Compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP 2 (Mar.
27, 2013), http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/909cb718-76dc-426 1 -a5bc-
3cf9dd5f5828/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2feb52cf-d8dd-4e5f-a5e5-
48d045b96280/The%20CFPB%20Issues%2OBuletin%20on%20Indirect/o20Auto%2OLend
ing%20and%20Compliance%20with%20the%2OEqual%2OCr.pdf2; CFPB, DOJ Announce
First Joint Fair Lending Action Against Indirect Auto Finance Company, BUCKLEY
SANDLER LLP (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-ca858117-
9cef-4794-a362-dcal20858f79 [hereinafter Joint Enforcement Announcement].
6. Thomas 0. Kelly III & Brent Ylvisaker, CFPB & Indirect Lending - The Saga
Continues, DORSEY (Nov. 19, 2013),
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While the worthiness of the CFPB's goal to ensure fair lending
in auto finance remains unquestioned, Congress and the auto finance
industry have raised serious questions about the Bulletin and the
agency's approach to its fair lending objective.
Accordingly, Part II of this Note provides a background to the
CFPB's role in fair lending, its concerns with indirect auto financing,
and its suggested solutions.8  Part III then discusses obstacles to the
effective implementation of the CFPB Bulletin.9 Part IV proceeds to
address potential problems with the Bulletin's enforcement,' 0 and Part
V examines the goals of the CFPB guidance and the impact that
achievement of those goals may have on the auto loan market."
Finally, Part VI concludes by suggesting that by ignoring the previously
understood meaning of the ECOA and issuing its Bulletin as guidance,
the CFPB may adversely change the standard of lending through auto
dealers and indirect lenders without fully understanding the crippling
effects such change may have on the auto loan market.12
http://www.dorsey.com/eu-fsrcfpb_indirectauto_1ending/; Cody Lyon, CFPB, DOJ Eye
Captives in Disparate Impact Probe (Sept. 23, 2013, 3:30 PM),
http://autofinancenews.net/profiles/blogs/cpfb-doj-eye-captives-in-disparate-impact-probe.
7. See generally Letter from the H. Comm. on Fin. Services to Richard Cordray, Dir.,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (May 28, 2013), available at
http://www.infobytesblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/House-Democrats-auto-
lending-letter-5-28-13.pdf [hereinafter Committee Letter]; Letter from Cong. to Patrice
Ficklin, Assistant Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (June 20, 2013), available at
http://www.infobytesblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/6-20-13-Republicans-Letter-to-
CFPB-re-Auto-Lending.pdf [hereinafter Congress Letter]; Letter from Senators to Richard
Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Oct. 30, 2013), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/SenatorsLettertoCordray.pdf [hereinafter
Senate Letter]; Letter from Blaine Leutkemeyer, Congressman, H.R., to Richard Cordray,
Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Nov. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2013/11/LetterCordray-auto-lending-11-15-20131.pdf
[hereinafter Leutkemeyer Letter]; Letter from Jeff Merkley, Sen., to Richard Cordray, Dir.,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Nov. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.nada.org/NR/rdonlyres/588CO8FO-4941-4503-8C40-
213251 DFC2DD/0/20131119_Sen_.MerkleyLetter toCFPB.pdf [hereinafter Merkley
Letter]; Nat'l Automobile Dealers Assoc., NADA and NAMAD Question CFPB's Approach
in its Guidance on Auto Lending, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 21, 2013, 7:01 PM),
http://news.yahoo.com/nada-namad-cfpbs-approach-guidance-auto-lending-230100971 html
[hereinafter NADA Statement].
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part VI.
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II. EQUAL CREDIT IN AUTo LENDING
A. Relevant Laws and Agencies
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 201013 (Dodd-Frank) in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis.14  Dodd-Frank created the CFPB in 2011 to
implement and enforce federal consumer financial laws in order to
promote fairness, transparency, and competition in markets for
consumer financial products and services.15
In furtherance of this purpose, Dodd-Frank granted ECOA
rulemaking authority to the CFPB over creditors within its
jurisdiction.16  The ECOA makes it "unlawful for any creditor to
discriminate against any applicant ... on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age (provided that the
applicant is old enough to contract)." 17 Regulation B' 8 implements the
ECOA for the purpose of promoting the availability of credit to
creditworthy applicants without regard to such prohibited factors.19
Even though the CFPB is tasked with enforcing the ECOA,
Dodd-Frank grants auto dealers a special exclusion from the
rulemaking, supervisory, and enforcement authority of the CFPB. 20 The
exclusion was included as an amendment championed by House
Financial Services Committee member, John Campbell, and former
Senator Sam Brownback.21 Senator Brownback, with hearty support
13. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5641 (2012).
14. Oversight of Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, CoMM. FIN. SERVICES,
http://financialservices.house.gov/dodd-frank/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
15. 12 U.S.C § 5511.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1691o-2 (2012); Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU 1 (June 2013), http://files.consumerfmance.gov/fl201306_cfpb_1aws-
and-regulations ecoa-combined-june-2013.pdf
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.1 (2013).
19. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (stating that Regulation B and the ECOA also prohibit
creditors from discriminating based on an applicant's reliance on income from public
assistance programs or on an applicant's good faith exercise of any right under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a).
21. Press Release, Nat'l Auto Dealers Ass'n, Auto Dealers Excluded from Wall Street
Bill (June 25, 2010), available at
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from auto lobbyists, took the position that auto dealers were "main
street" retailers who were not responsible for the financial crisis and
should, therefore, not be regulated by Dodd-Frank-as opposed to Wall
Street bankers who played a significant role in the 2008 financial
collapse. 22  The amendment was controversial and was opposed by
President Barack Obama and both namesakes of Dodd-Frank:
Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher Dodd.23
Consumer advocates also opposed the auto dealer exclusion citing the
disparities in the interest rates afforded to African-American and
Hispanic borrowers. 24
B. Indirect Auto Lending and Dealer Compensation
The Bulletin targets a fair lending concern pertaining to a
common auto dealer compensation practice whereby an auto dealer is
compensated for assisting a customer with financing a car purchase
through a third-party lender.25
When consumers want to purchase a vehicle on credit, they may
apply for a loan directly with a financial institution, but more often an
auto dealer will collect the consumer-applicant's relevant credit
information and act as a middleman between the applicant and the
http://www.nada.org/MediaCenter/News+Releases/20 10/Auto+Dealers+Excluded+from+W
all+Street+Bill.htm.
22. 156 CONG. REc. S5912 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (recording the statements of Sen.
Sam Brownback).
23. Brady Dennis, Oversight Exemption for Auto Dealers Gaining Traction, WASH.
POsT (June 23, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/22/AR2010062205323.html?sid=ST2010062205332
(discussing the views of Rep. Frank, chairman of the House-Senate Conference Committee
and Sen. Dodd, former chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, on the auto dealer
exclusion amendment to Dodd-Frank); see also David Dayen, CFPA Passes House
Committee; Amendment Exempting Auto Dealer Financing Passes, Too, FIREDOGLAKE (Oct.
22, 2009, 9:38 AM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2009/10/22/cfpa-passes-house-commiittee-
amendment-exempting-auto-dealer-financing-passes-too/; David Schepp, Auto Dealers
Carve Out Exemption in Consumer-Protection Legislation, DAILY FIN. (Dec. 4, 2009, 5:11
PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/10/24/auto-dealers-carve-out-exemption-in-
consumer-protection-legislat/.
24. Danielle Douglas, Justice Department Teams with CFPB in Probe of Possible
Discriminatory Auto Financing, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/justice-department-teams-with-cfpb-in-
probe-of-possible-discriminatory-auto-financing/ 2 013/11/14/8fc8e8ae-4d5 1-11 e3-9890-
a 1 e0997fb0cOstory.htnl.
25. See generally BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 1.
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lender.26 In these transactions, an auto dealer typically collects a credit
applicant's information and offers that information to creditors or,
"indirect auto lenders." 27  The indirect auto lenders can then either
decline to become involved in the transaction or, alternatively, they can
provide the dealer with a risk-based minimum interest rate at which the
lender is willing to offer the loan to the applicant customer. 28  The
minimum interest rate a lender is willing to offer an applicant is called
the "buy rate." 29 Traditionally, auto lenders allowed dealers to mark up
the interest rate offered to customers above the minimum buy rate. 30
The indirect lender would then compensate the dealer for obtaining the
loan based on the increased interest revenues the lender received at the
higher rate secured by the auto dealer.31  This compensation practice
incentivizes dealers to secure optimal rates for lenders. 32 Compensation
based on increased interest revenues from dealer markups is also called
"reserve" or "participation" 33 compensation. 34
In March 2012, the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), a
consumer advocate group, condemned the practice of dealer markup
compensation. 35  The CRL's research estimated that, in 2009,
consumers paid an estimated $25.8 billion over the lives of their loans
because of dealer markups. 36 Additionally, the research indicated that
African-American borrowers paid more for their financing through
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 1. Another method of allowing dealers to mark up
interest rates is through the use of rate sheets. Lenders can provide auto dealers with a list
of predetermined buy rates based on the applicant's credit information, which permits the
dealer to mark up those rates when an applicant's credit establishes the applicant's
minimum buy rate according to the rate sheet. Id. at 3.
32. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, COMMENTS TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
MOTOR VEHICLE ROUNDTABLES 6 (Mar. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/auto-financing/research-
analysis/FTC-Comment-February-2-2012.pdf.
33. Dealer reserve or dealer participation is the practice at issue in the Bulletin. It is
the practice of dealers marking up the interest rate from the buy rate the lender issues. If the
consumer agrees to the higher interest rate, then the dealer will keep some percentage as
compensation for their assistance in obtaining the loan. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 1.
34. Id.
35. See generally CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 32.
36. Id. at 5.
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dealers than similarly-situated Caucasian borrowers.37  However,
despite the empirical evidence of the negative effects of dealer markups,
even the CFPB concedes that auto dealers' facilitation of the auto loan
process is valuable and, therefore, deserves compensation.38
C. The CFPB Characterization ofIndirect Lender Liability
The Bulletin asserts that dealer reserve compensation, and
especially dealers' discretion in setting interest rates, leaves consumers
vulnerable to discrimination. 39 Therefore, the Bulletin cautions indirect
lenders that they may face liability under the ECOA and Regulation B
should they engage in discriminatory lending practices.40
Before the Bulletin's issuance, indirect lenders were not aware
of potential liability under the ECOA for dealer compensation practices
because Regulation B was previously understood as a safe harbor
limiting a creditor's liability for another creditor's violations.4'
Regulation B provides that "a person is not a creditor regarding any
violation of the ECOA or Regulation B committed by another creditor
unless the person knew or had reasonable notice of the act, policy, or
practice that constituted the violation before becoming involved in the
credit transaction."42 The Bulletin, however, states that it is incorrect to
assume that creditors are not liable under the ECOA for disparities in
interest rates caused by the dealer reserve compensation policies.43
The Bulletin reminds auto lenders that it is illegal for a
37. DELVIN DAVIS, NON-NEGOTIABLE: NEGOTIATION DOESN'T HELP AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND LATINOS ON DEALER-FINANCED CAR LOANS 2 (Jan. 2014), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/auto-financing/research-
analysis/CRL-Auto-Non-Neg-Report.pdf.
38. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Director Cordray Remarks at the CFPB
Auto Finance Forum (Nov. 14 2013), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/director-cordray-remarks-at-the-cfpb-auto-
finance-forum/ [hereinafter Cordray Remarks].
39. See generally BULLETIN, supra note 2. The Center for Responsible Lending reports
that African-Americans and Latinos receive higher interest rates when they negotiate their
auto loans through dealers than when they negotiate directly with lenders. DAVIS, supra
note 37, at 2.
40. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3.
41. Hogan et al., supra note 5, at 4.
42. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(1) (2013); BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3; Michelle A. Samaad,
Auto Trade Groups Question CFPB's Indirect Lending Guidance, CREDIT UNION TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.cutirnes.com/2013/03/22/auto-trade-groups-question-cfpbs-
indirect-lending (saying trade groups question CFPB targeting of dealer practices).
43. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3.
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"creditor" to discriminate based on a prohibited factor under the
ECOA.44 Under the ECOA, a "creditor" is defined as "any person who
in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit
decision, including setting the terms of the credit." 45  The term
"creditor" also includes "a person who ... regularly refers applicants or
prospective applicants to creditors, or selects or offers to select creditors
to whom requests for credit may be made."4 6 According to this
definition, auto dealers are creditors for the purposes of the ECOA.47
Finally, the Commentary to Regulation B provides that
"creditor" includes all persons participating in the credit decision,
"includ[ing] an assignee or a potential purchaser of the obligation who
influences the credit decision by indicating whether or not it will
purchase the obligation if the transaction is consummated."48
Therefore, the Bulletin designates indirect auto lenders as "creditors"
and while the CFPB recognizes a "continuum of indirect lender
participation in credit decisions," standard practices of indirect auto
dealers would likely constitute participation in a credit decision under
ECOA and Regulation B. 49  The Bulletin also provides that "[a]n
indirect auto lender's markup and compensation policies may alone be
sufficient to trigger liability under the ECOA if the lender regularly
participates in a credit decision and its policies result in
discrimination."so
D. CFPB Suggestions for Limiting Lender Liability Exposure
The CFPB listed several relatively simple suggestions for how
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012) (forbidding discrimination under the ECOA based
on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, reliance on income from a
public assistance program, or good faith exercise of any rights under the Consumer Credit
Protection Act); see also id. at 2.
45. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(1) (2013).
46. Id.
47. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2. This sets up a quandary. Auto dealers are technically
creditors under ECOA, which the CFPB is tasked with enforcing. Id. However, Dodd-
Frank specifically excludes auto dealers from CFPB jurisdiction. 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a)
(2012). The CFPB circumvents the exclusion by charging indirect auto lenders with
vicariously liability for other "creditors" and requiring creditors under its jurisdiction to
police the auto dealers that it may not directly regulate itself. See id.; see also BULLETIN,
supra note 2, at 2.
48. 12 C.F.R. § 1002(1) (2013); see also BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2.
49. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2; Samaad, supra note 42.
50. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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indirect auto lenders might limit their liability under the ECOA,
including creating an up-to-date fair lending policy statement, regularly
training employees in fair lending, and continuously monitoring for
policy compliance.5 ' Other suggestions, such as regular analysis of all
loan data for potential disparities, are much more onerous to carry out,
especially since the Bulletin neglects to include a threshold or standard
for measuring disparities that would indicate non-compliance with the
ECOA.52
Additionally, the Bulletin indicates that if indirect lenders want
to retain dealer markups, those lenders might be required to not only
monitor lending and identify disparities, but also to commence prompt
corrective action against dealers. Such corrective action includes
restricting or eliminating the dealer markup policies, excluding dealers
from future transactions, and promptly remunerating affected
consumers if disparities are identified. 54
Since the Bulletin was issued in March 2013, the CFPB has
further elaborated on its suggestions for alternate compensation
policies. 5 The agency clarified that the Bulletin does not mandate flat
fees or any other particular method of dealer compensation.56 It also
expanded its suggestions for alternate dealer compensation methods to
include a fixed percentage of the amount financed."
The Bulletin warns that the CFPB will continue to closely
review indirect auto lenders' operations and will use all appropriate
regulatory tools to assess whether supervisory or enforcement action
may be necessary to protect consumers. In remarks at the CFPB Auto
Finance Forum, CFPB Director Richard Cordray reaffirmed the
agency's vow to root out discriminatory lending practices in auto
lending, including those "fair in form but discriminatory in operation."59
51. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 4; PEPPER HAMILTON, supra note 1.
52. See BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 4.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id.
55. See generally Letter from Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to
Rob Portman and Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senators (Nov. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.nada.orgfNR/rdonlyres/2982D839-5C4E-4B46-AE7B-
7591 DA7704DO/0/20131104_CFPBResponse toPortmanShaheen.pdf [hereinafter Letter
to Senators]; see also Cordray Remarks, supra note 38.
56. Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 5.
57. Cordray Remarks, supra note 38.
58. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 5.
59. Cordray Remarks, supra note 38.
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E. Overview of the Bulletin's Reception
The Bulletin sparked a great deal of commentary from the auto
and lending industries and Congress. 60  The National Automobile
Dealers Association (NADA) and the National Association of Minority
Auto Dealers (NAMAD) issued a joint statement questioning the
CFPB's approach and raising concern that the Bulletin will increase the
cost of auto financing by impairing competition in the auto-lending
market.61
Additionally, in letters to the CFPB, 62 several House
Republicans and Democrats, in both separate and bipartisan efforts
requested more transparency in the analysis that led the CFPB to
conclude that dealer reserve practices were discriminatory or potentially
discriminatory.63 In response to the inquiries, the CFPB restated its
goal of eliminating discrimination resulting from the dealer reserve
practice, but provided little more to elaborate on its use of proxies.64
Perhaps, the greater problem with dealer markups is the lack of
public awareness and disclosure requirements. 65 There is evidence that
the public is largely unaware of dealer markups. 66 In 2010, however,
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) eliminated similar compensation for
mortgage loan originators, finding the practice unfair to consumers
under the Fair Trade Commission Act and finding that disclosure
requirements alone were not enough to protect consumers. 67
60. See generally Letter from Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to
Rep. Terri Sewell (June 20, 2013), available at
http://www.icemiller.com/enewsletter/Current-C/080213%201etter%20to%2OCongress%20-
%20Indirect%20Auto%2OFinancing.PDF [hereinafter Letter to Congress] (replying to
requests for clarification from Congress).
61. See generally NADA Statement, supra note 7.
62. See generally Committee Letter, supra note 7; see also Congress Letter, supra note
7; Senate Letter, supra note 7; Leutkemeyer Letter, supra note 7; Merkley Letter, supra note
7.
63. David N. Anthony et al., Republicans Demand Answers from CFPB on Indirect
Auto Lending Guidelines, TROUTMAN SANDERS (June 25, 2013),
http://www.troutmansanders.com/republicans-demand-answers-from-cfpb-on-indirect-auto-
lending-guidelines-06-25-2013/.
64. See Letter to Congress, supra note 60, at 2-3.
65. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 32, at 4.
66. See id. (showing the CRL surveyed North Carolina voters and found that 79% were
unaware of the dealer markup practice).
67. See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2012); see also
id.
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However, the FRB first issued a formal rule, 68 subject to
comment and analysis required by the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) when it changed the method of compensation for mortgage loan
originators. 69 The formality of the rule and the jurisdiction of the FRB
made the rule applicable to anyone who might engage in work as a loan
originator. 70 Even the CRL, through its criticism of dealer markup
compensation, urged the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to use its
rule-making authority to change dealer compensation in auto lending.71
Even though the CRL sought to classify dealer markups as "unfair and
deceptive practices," it did not fathom that a change in the practice
would come out of an interpretive letter rather than APA rulemaking.72
The CFPB has a well-eamed reputation for aggressive
enforcement of federal regulations. While the Bulletin demonstrates
the CFPB's continued zealous protection of consumers, it also
illustrates the failings of pursuing lofty regulatory ambitions without a
stable foundation from which to launch such a campaign.74
III. OBSTACLES To IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFPB BULLETIN
A. CFPB Jurisdiction
The CFPB has authority to supervise and enforce federal
consumer financial laws regardless of whether the institution is a
depository or non-depository institution. The agency has primary
68. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) (2013) (restricting the methods of compensation for
mortgage loan originators); see also 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2012) (defining the jurisdiction of the
FRB).
69. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20100816d.htm.
70. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(d) (2013) (prohibiting compensation for mortgage loan
originators from anyone other than the consumer in connection with the transaction); see
also 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2012) (defining the jurisdiction of the FRB).
71. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 32, at 4.
72. Id.
73. See Jacob Gerber, Comment, Silence Isn't Golden: The CFPB's Privilege Rule and
the Risk of Failure under Chevron Step One, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 275, 287 (2013); see
also Justin Whitesides, The CFPB Is Keeping an Aggressive Pace, CREDIT UNION MAG.
(Feb. 2013),
http://mydigimag.rrd.com/article/The CFPB_IsKeepingAnAggressivePace/1288389/1
43022/article.html.
74. See discussion infra Part III.
75. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514-5515 (2012).
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enforcement authority over insured depository institutions and credit
unions with assets over $10 billion, while those with assets less than
$10 billion are subject to enforcement by their primary federal
regulator.76  While the CFPB's rules apply to non-depository
institutions within their jurisdiction, Dodd-Frank specifically excluded
auto dealers from the CFPB's rulemaking and enforcement authority.
Indirect auto lenders, however, may be subject to vicarious liability for
other "creditor" action under the ECOA, and auto dealers are considered
"creditors" under the ECOA definition.78 The Bulletin therefore seeks
not to regulate auto dealers directly, but rather to effectively enlist
indirect auto lenders under its jurisdiction; in order to police auto dealer
transactions that otherwise would be outside its jurisdiction.79
This approach is problematic because without primary
enforcement authority over smaller banks and credit unions with assets
totaling less than $10 billion, implementation of the Bulletin may occur
unevenly across the auto-lending industry.80 If lenders continue
allowing dealer discretion and interest rate markups, larger creditors
will run the risk of noncompliance in the eyes of an aggressive and
zealous CFPB.8 Other regulatory enforcers, however, such as the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the FRB, or the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), will have the primary enforcement authority to
carry out those rules against smaller creditors outside of the CFPB's
jurisdiction. 82 Dodd-Frank allows regulators with primary jurisdiction
over CFPB-exempt institutions the exclusive authority to enforce
consumer protection laws. However, even if regulators want to
enforce the Bulletin against indirect lenders, they may not be able to
enforce the Bulletin consistent with the CFPB interpretation, since the
CFPB has not provided the threshold or standard it uses to determine
76. 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d).
77. Id. § 5519(a).
78. 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(1) (2013); BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2-3.
79. See BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3.
80. See 12 U.S.C § 5516(d).
81. See Leonard Chanin et al., CFPB Fair Lending Guidance for Indirect Auto
Lenders-It's Not Just about Cars, MORRISON FOERSTER 1 (June 4, 2013),
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130604-CFPB-Auto-Lenders.pdf.
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d).
83. See id.
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when enforcement action is appropriate. 84 Enforcement could therefore
be inconsistent, especially since the Bulletin does not create a formal
rule that would necessarily bind other enforcement agencies.85
The CFPB may notify other regulators of material violations of
federal consumer financial law and recommend action to which other
regulators must respond within sixty days.86  It seems that unless
regulators develop their own threshold standards for determining
discrimination, other regulators must wait for either a notification from
the CFPB or CFPB guidance on the measurement standard they will use
to enforce the Bulletin against lenders within their primary enforcement
jurisdiction.
Even though other enforcement agencies may not be bound to
enforce the CFPB guidance against creditors outside CFPB jurisdiction,
other agencies have shown support and coordination with the CFPB to
enforce the Bulletin.87 In December 2013, the CFPB and DOJ
announced the agencies' first joint fair lending enforcement action in an
attempt to enforce the Bulletin against Ally. 88 The enforcement action
settled for $98 million, the largest auto finance action ever and the third
largest fair lending action for the DOJ.89
Ally is clearly within CFPB jurisdiction as one of the largest
indirect auto lenders in the United States. 90 Nevertheless, agencies that
84. See id. § 5516(d)(2) (describing the referral process when the CFPB believes that a
party outside its jurisdiction has violated federal consumer financial law as a process
instigated by the CFPB and demonstrating that either through this process or outside of it
other regulators cannot take initiative without a standard by which to measure
discrimination across lender portfolios).
85. See Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 3.
86. See id.
87. See PEPPER HAMILTON, supra note 1 (discussing the CFPB Auto Finance Forum
held in Washington, DC and mentioning that it was attended by several federal agencies,
including the DOJ); see also Joint Enforcement Announcement, supra note 5.
88. See Joint Enforcement Announcement, supra note 5; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Reach $98 Million
Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Auto Lending Discrimination by Ally (Dec. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-crt-1349.html [hereinafter
Settlement Press Release].
89. Joint Enforcement Announcement, supra note 5 (noting that Ally was required to
pay $80 million in compensation to victims of discrimination and $18 million to the CFPB's
Civil Penalty Fund in addition to improving monitoring and compliance systems).
90. See Consent Order by CFPB for Ally, 2013-CFPB-0010, available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20131 2cfpbconsent-order.ally.pdf; Press Release,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB and DOJ Order Ally to Pay $80 Million to Consumers
Harmed by Discriminatory Auto Loan Pricing (Dec. 20, 2013); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5515(c)
(2012) (defining CFPB jurisdiction to cover insured depository institutions and credit unions
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are not bound to enforce the Bulletin may still have incentive to pursue
large settlements, like the one against Ally. The concern is that lenders
outside CFPB jurisdiction, by definition smaller institutions, will not
receive consistent enforcement from their prudential regulators because
they are not required to enforce the Bulletin and do not have a standard
by which to independently enforce it.9 1
B. Implementation Issues: Informal Guidance Versus Formal Rule
1. CFPB Rulemaking
The second problem with the Bulletin is it was issued in the
form of guidance rather than as a formal rule. 92 The Bulletin introduces
new interpretations of the ECOA and Regulation B that were not clearly
or previously understood from the text of Regulation B. 93  Formal
CFPB rulemaking, however, is subject to the requirements of Dodd-
Frank and the APA, while informal CFPB guidance is not. 94
2. Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Requirements
Dodd-Frank requires that before issuing a rule the CFPB must
consider the potential costs and benefits to consumers and covered
providers of consumer financial services, including any potential
decrease of customer access to consumer financial products or services
resulting from such a rule. 95 Moreover, the CFPB may not adopt any
rule without first consulting with federal bank regulators and
appropriate agencies "about the 'consistency' of the proposed rule with
'practical, market, or systematic objectives of such agencies."'96
with assets totaling more than $10 billion).
91. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d) (providing enforcement authority to primary regulators for
depository institutions and credit unions with assets totaling less than $10 billion).
92. See Brett Foster et al., Locke Lord QuickStudy: Discretionary Pricing in Auto
Lending and the CFPB (Oh No!) LOcKE LORD LLP (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.lockelord.com/qs_2013discretionarypricing/.
93. See Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 4-5; BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3.
94. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (governing agency
rulemaking); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b) (describing the additional requirements for
formal rulemaking imposed on the CFPB by Dodd-Frank).
95. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b).
96. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry's Misguided Quest to
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Because rules are subject to mandatory oversight by other regulators,
and careful consideration of costs and benefits to consumers under
Dodd-Frank, it is a quicker, easier process for the CFPB to issue a
Bulletin rather than a formal rule.97
3. APA Rulemaking Requirements
Additionally, all federal rulemaking is subject to the notice and
comment requirements of the APA.98 The APA requires agencies to
give notice and opportunity to "interested persons to participate in the
rulemaking process through submission of written data, views, or
arguments." 99 The APA does not apply to interpretive rules or general
statements of policy. 00 Agencies will often, however, allow a comment
period for publications involving significant policy actions. 01
4. The CFPB Decision Not to Issue a Rule
This interpretation was not published for comment because the
CFPB does not acknowledge a change in the state of the current law
concerning auto lending in its Bulletin. 0 2 The guidance, according to
the CFPB, took the form of cautionary remarks simply informing
indirect auto lenders that they "may be operating under the incorrect
assumption that they are not liable under the ECOA for pricing
disparities." 0 3
Senators Portman (R-OH) and Shaheen (D-NH) requested an
explanation of how the Bulletin is consistent with federal law and the
APA.104  The CFPB responded in a letter stating that in considering
whether to issue a formal rule, the CFPB decided that existing law,
Undermine The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 881,
910 (2012) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)).
97. See id.
98. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
99. Id. § 553(c).
100. Id. § 553(b).
101. See Federal Register, A Guide to the Rulemaking Process (accessed Jan. 28, 2014)
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/201 1/01/therulemakin&.process.pdf.
102. See Cordray Remarks, supra note 38; see also Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at
4-5 (responding that the CFPB chose not to issue a rule because the Bulletin was published
to "remind" and "offer guidance" implying that nothing had changed).
103. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3.
104. See generally Senate Letter, supra note 7.
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regulation, and official commentary already addressed the subject
matter of the Bulletin.'05 The letter explained that the CFPB merely
reminded lenders of their responsibilities under the ECOA and offered
guidance on how to address risks.106  The CFPB concluded it was
therefore not statutorily required to comply with the APA notice and
comment requirements, though it mentioned that it "advised" the FRB
and FTC about the Bulletin before it was issued.107
5. Change in Understanding of the Law Warrants a Rule
While the CFPB emphasized that the Bulletin did not "create or
change any new regulatory requirements," lenders considered the
Bulletin a new interpretation of the law.108 Regulation B states that "a
person is not a creditor regarding any violation of [the ECOA] or
[Regulation B] committed by another creditor unless the person knew or
had reasonable notice of the act, policy, or practice that constituted the
violation before becoming involved in the credit transaction." 1o9
Creditors previously understood this section of Regulation B to be a
safe harbor, limiting a creditor's liability for another creditor's
violation.110 However, the Bulletin completely changed the common
understanding of the law by stating:
This provision limits a creditor's liability for
another creditor's ECOA violations under certain
circumstances. But it does not limit a creditor's liability
for its own violations-including, for example, disparities
on a prohibited basis that result from the creditor's
markup and compensation policies."'
The Bulletin thereby reinterprets dealer markups, which were
105. See Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 4.
106. See id.
107. Id. (suggesting that advising the FRB and FTC would have met the requirement of
Dodd-Frank that the CFPB consult other appropriate agencies when rulemaking, while not
conceding that the Bulletin was subject to rulemaking requirements of either Dodd-Frank or
the APA); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (2012).
108. Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 4 (emphasis added).
109. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(1) (2013).
110. Hogan et al., supra note 5, at 4.
111. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3; see also Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 2-3.
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previously considered actions of auto dealers acting of their own
volition, which would have insulated lenders from liability under
Regulation B.112 Rather than considering the auto dealers' actions as
separate from those of the lenders, the Bulletin views the compensation
policy and allowance of dealer discretion as action by the lenders, for
which they may be held liable if the dealer's discretion results in a
violation of the ECOA."' While this interpretation now affects indirect
auto lenders as it did not in the past, the CFPB nevertheless maintains
that the Bulletin does not change the law, but serves merely as a
reminder with "nothing new" to add.114
6. The Value of the APA Process
The APA serves an important governmental check on the
legislative powers of unelected officials who effectively create law
through bureaucratic or administrative action, rather than legislation."
Circumventing the APA requirements deprives regulated entities of
procedures that legitimize administrative policies and protect against
encroachments.1" 6 When an agency issues guidance as opposed to a
rule, a concerned public is barred from asking questions and discussing
the implications of the decision with the agency." 7 Another drawback
to interpretive rules is that there is no implementation period for
creditors to bring their performance into compliance, even as they still
question the full meaning and methods of compliance." 8 Lenders are
expected to preemptively comply with the onerous and perhaps
aggressive suggestions for compliance outlined in the Bulletin, despite
112. See BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3.
113. See id.
114. Cordray Remarks, supra note 38.
115. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see generally Jill Nylander, The Administrative
Procedure Act, 85 MICHIGAN BAR J. 38 (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.michbar.org/joumal/pdf/pdf4articlel078.pdf (describing the role of the
Administrative Procedure Act).
116. See Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded
Them Offer Insight Into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B. U. L. REv. 1303, 1310 (2010)
(quoting to Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of
Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN L. REv. 343, 344-345 (2009)).
117. See Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 3 ("However, publishing guidance avoids
transparency and discussion of the issue, doing the CFPB and the public a disservice.").
118. See id.
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any lingering questions, lest risk noncompliance liability." 9
7. The Problem with Bypassing the Dodd-Frank Rulemaking
Requirements
Dodd-Frank requires the CFPB to consider the costs and
benefits of its rule, presumably because there is value in considering the
impacts. 120 A bipartisan congressional letter asked whether the CFPB
conducted a cost-benefit analysis of how an industry move to
compensate dealers for arranging financing through flat fees would
affect the auto-lending market and consumers, since the CFPB
recommends flat fees in the Bulletin.121 The CFPB repeated that it was
not obligated to do so because its Bulletin was not subject to Dodd-
Frank's rulemaking requirements, but admitted that it had neither
conducted any studies of how market-wide adoption of a flat-fee
compensation program would affect credit availability, nor had it
analyzed the impact of all of the recommendations it made to lenders to
eliminate discrimination from their indirect auto-lending programs. 122
More alarmingly, the CFPB response did not state whether it had
weighed the costs and benefits of any of its recommended lender
actions. 123 The CFPB stated that in general, it believes "that fair
lending and the legitimate needs of creditors are compatible." 24
8. Binding Power of an Interpretive Rule
Bypassing the process of notice and comment rulemaking
exposes the Bulletin to other problems. The Bulletin takes the form of
an "interpretive rule" defined as "rules or statements issued by an
agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the statutes
and rules which it administers." 25 The APA exempts interpretive rules
119. See Settlement Press Release, supra note 88 (announcing the first auto lending
settlement a mere nine months after the Bulletin was issued and citing Ally's first efforts
beginning in early 2013 as failures).
120. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b) (2012) (setting additional rulemaking requirements).
121. See Senate Letter, supra note 7.
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. See Fraser, supra note 116, at 1307 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947)).
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from its notice and comment requirements.126 However, when a rule is
promulgated as an interpretive rule, its binding power is unclear.127
Interpretive rules are not legally binding, but the extent to which
they are practically binding is a "function of the likelihood that they will
be challenged in court, and then of the likelihood that the court will
uphold them."1 28 In the wake of United States v. Mead,129 a court is
likely to apply "Skidmore deference" 30 to a non-legislative agency
rule.'" In Mead, the Court applied Skidmore deference saying,
"[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-
style deference."1 32 Applying this standard, the court determined the
weight of an administrator's judgment in a particular case is based on
"the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control." 33
Therefore, the CFPB Bulletin is not legally binding, but it is
binding in effect to the extent that weak judicial deference allows.' 34
But since a substantive review of the Bulletin under Skidmore deference
is unlikely to occur outside of a defense to a CFPB enforcement action
in a U.S. district court, it remains a game of roulette to risk
noncompliance with the Bulletin's warnings and encouragements. 135
126. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
127. Fraser, supra note 116, at 1319-20 (citing Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in
Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1313, 1314 (2001)).
128. Id.
129. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
130. Skidmore deference is "weak deference" or "nothing more than respect or
courteous regard." Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore within the
Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1109-10 (2001).
131. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240-41 (2001) (stating that only
when agencies act through adjudication, notice and comment rulemaking or another
procedure indicating congressional intent is Chevron deference applicable and once it is
determined not to be applicable, Skidmore deference applies); see also Christensen v. Harris
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (providing an example of Skidmore deference).
132. When giving Chevron deference, courts should defer to agency interpretations of
statutes unless those interpretations are unreasonable. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
133. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
134. Fraser, supra note 116, at 1326.
135. See id. at 1319.
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This uncertainty on the Bulletin's binding authority puts lenders
between a rock and a hard place: weighing the risks of noncompliance
with the benefits of continuing to allow dealer reserve
compensations.136  The comparatively risk averse nature of some
lenders may make the Bulletin binding, while others may not find the
need to adhere to a non-legally binding rule, leading to uneven
implementation of the Bulletin.
Finally, while the binding effect of the Bulletin on regulated
parties is uncertain, the form of the issuance as guidance also affects its
binding effect on other regulatory agencies, which compounds the
problem of the CFPB's limited jurisdiction.'37 Because the CFPB has
chosen to publish the Bulletin as guidance rather than a rule, the
guidance amounts to a recommendation on how the ECOA should be
applied.' 38 Other enforcement agencies may choose not to enforce the
ECOA consistently with the CFPB's interpretation, even if the other
agencies are given a threshold by which to measure discriminations.1 39
The CFPB's interpretive rule will likely dictate its own enforcement
posture, but other agencies enforcing the ECOA for lenders with less
than $10 billion are not bound to adopt the same stance.140
C. Proxy and Data Collection Issues
1. Reliability of Proxies as Stand-In Values for Real Data
Even though the form of the Bulletin creates uncertainty around
the "reach and legal quality of the standards the agency has
imposed,"'41 it is not clear whether the CFPB is able to reliably measure
or provide a measurable standard for the discrimination it seeks to root
out from indirect lending practices. 142
136. See id.
137. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(c), 5516(d) (2012).
138. See id. § 5516(d).
139. See generally id. § 5515(c).
140. See id. § 5516(d).
141. Fraser, supra note 116, at 1310.
142. See Carl G. Pry, Proxy Expectations, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE (Jan.-Feb. 2014),
http://www.treliant.com/NewsandEvents/Articles/ArticleDetails/tabid/147/ArticlelD/26617/
Carl-G-Pry-Proxy-Expectations (explaining the shortcomings of proxy values as substitution
for real data).
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The Bulletin states that, "there is a significant risk [of] ...
pricing disparities on the basis of race, national origin, and potentially
other prohibited bases."l 43  However, the CFPB's research into
discrimination relied solely on mathematical proxies for race and
ethnicity that are susceptible to significant margins of error. 144The
proxies used Social Security Administration (SSA) and Census Bureau
information as well as applicants' surnames and geographic location to
create stand-in values that estimate the chance that someone is a racial
or ethnic minority.145 The CFPB then used the proxy values for race
and ethnicity to determine where consumers might be experiencing
discrimination based on the interest rates these proxy-determined
minorities received.146
Upon request from both House Democrats and Republicans for
greater disclosure surrounding the data and thresholds that the CFPB
used to determine the existence of disparities, the CFPB merely
reiterated that it relied on proxies using publicly available surname and
geographic data from the SSA and the Census Bureau to produce its
results.147 The CFPB reaffirmed its use of this "integrated method" in a
second letter to Congress on November 4, 2013.148 The accuracy of
discrimination data based on such methods, as a replacement for
statistical data, is questionable. 14 9 The CFPB maintains, however, that
such proxy methodology has been used for decades in support of civil
rights claims, including voting rights cases, Title VII cases, and equal
protection matters.' 50 The CFPB also stated "research has found that
the integrated approach produces proxies that correlate highly with self-
reported race and national origin data and is more accurate than using
surname or geography alone."' 5 1
143. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 2.
144. See Foster et al., supra note 92.
145. Letter to Congress, supra note 60, at 2-3.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 2-4.
149. Pry, supra note 142 (asking for example, what are the chances that a proxy based
on last name Perez in rural Dobson, North Carolina will correctly identify a Caucasian
applicant).
150. See Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 2.
151. Id. at 3.
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2. Comparison of Auto Lender Data and Mortgage Lending Data
The Bulletin released by the CFPB was not supported by any
corresponding data collection legislation, since auto dealers are
excluded from the CFPB's purview. 152 Congress did not enact
legislation requiring auto dealers to collect data on their lending
transactions to help the CFPB regulate outside its jurisdiction.15' The
CFPB is, therefore, unable to rely on hard data about consumers, which
is why it relies solely on proxies. 54
By contrast, the CFPB has been successful in carrying out its
mandates in the mortgage market under Dodd-Frank largely because of
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which requires data
collection for transactions subject to the HMDA.'5 5  Because the
mortgage market is expressly subject to the CFPB's regulations,
Congress enacted supporting data collection legislation. 156 Dodd-Frank
even empowers the CFPB to expand on the requirements of the HMDA,
further facilitating the CFPB's collection of information about the
consumer's race and ethnicity in mortgage transactions. 157 Unlike the
CFPB's regulation of auto lending, the HDMA enables the CFPB to
collect accurate data in mortgage lending.' 5 8
3. Data and Compliance Expectations
The lack of hard data make it difficult for the CFPB to provide
quantifiable justification for its Bulletin, but it also raises significant
issues with its expectation that indirect auto lenders will be capable of
measuring their compliance or identifying potential discriminatory
152. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a) (2012) (excluding auto dealers from CFPB
jurisdiction and providing no data collection provisions).
153. See generally id.
154. See generally id.
155. See generally Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811
(2012).
156. See generally id. §§ 2801-2811. Regulation C implements the HMDA. See 12
C.F.R. § 1003 (2013).
157. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Home Disclosure Act (HMDA) and Regulation C-
Compliance Management; CFPB HMDA Resubmission schedule and Guidelines; and
HMDA Enforcement, CFPB BULL. No. 2013-11 (Oct. 9, 2013), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20131 0-cfpb hmda-compliance-bulletin fair-
lending.pdf.
158. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(h) (2012).
2014] 419
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
impacts. 159
The CFPB's difficulty in establishing a widely credible
methodology for identifying discrimination without compelling
disclosure from consumers is no surprise. There are many permissible
factors that potentially influence a negotiated interest rate, including a
consumer's negotiating style, commitment to the transaction, the type of
vehicle selected, or the time frame of the transaction.160  Without
properly taking these factors into account, it is difficult to demonstrate
with any certainty that discrimination was the cause for a higher interest
rate.' 6 1 Also, even if the integrated method is a sufficiently reliable way
to measure discrimination, it is unlikely that many dealers will make
enough auto loans to produce statistically significant results for lenders
to identify discrimination within individual dealer portfolios.' 62 If the
CFPB expects indirect auto lenders to discontinue business with a
dealer or issue swift remuneration to affected customers, reliance on
insufficient data to comply with enigmatic standards is problematic. 163
Finally, the CFPB analysis ignores a crucial reality of dealer
reserve compensation. 164  Dealer markups are part of a two-pronged
negotiation over purchase price and interest rate, and compensation
from markups can be used to offset lower purchase prices.165 So
analyzing interest rates alone does not assess the total impact of the
transaction, whether positive or negative, to the consumer.166 The
CFPB analysis of interest rates, therefore, fails to conclusively establish
159. See Pry, supra note 142.
160. Yan Cao, Driving Toward Equality: Responses to Auto-Loan Discrimination, NYU
LAW MAGAZINE (2013), available at
http://issuu.com/nyulaw/docs/complete_1aw-school-magazine_2013/83 (listing factors
other than race that may impact the setting of an interest rate).
161. See id.
162. Christine A. Edwards & Julius L. Loeser, CFPB Issues Bulletin on Indirect Auto
Lending and Fair Lending, WINSTON & STRAwN 2 (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/cfpbIssues.pdf (noting that it is not likely
that individual auto dealers will make enough sales to produce a meaningful statistical
regression analysis).
163. See BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 5 (suggesting, among other things, that lenders
discontinue business with dealers when discrepancies are identified).
164. See Christopher J Willis, How the CFPB's Stance on ECOA in Auto Finance Will
Raise Consumer Prices, CFPB MONrrOR (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/03/27/how-the-cfpbs-stance-on-ecoa-in-auto-finance-
will-raise-consumer-prices/.
165. See id.
166. Id.
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any negative impact to minority consumers, even if it had relied on
accurate data.167
IV. ENFORCEMENT
A. The CFPB's Reliance on the Controversial Theory of Disparate
Impact
The Bulletin seems to take its theory of liability directly from an
amicus curiae brief filed by the DOJ in support of the plaintiffs in
Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp.168  In the brief, the DOJ
argued that Nissan was liable for discriminatory practices of a particular
Nissan dealership because it "designed and implemented the very
system that quite predictably resulted in the alleged discriminatory
conduct by dealers." 69 The DOJ also argued that Nissan had the ability
to establish policies preventing dealer pricing on an illegal basis and
could have monitored for racial disparities.170  The case ultimately
settled, and Nissan agreed to a cap on discretionary dealer pricing to
address the issue. 171
The Bulletin elaborates on the DOJ's legal arguments,
announcing that lenders may be liable for disparities within the lender's
portfolio under the legal doctrines of both disparate treatment and
disparate impact.172 There are issues in applying each of these theories
to indirect lender liability.
167. See id.
168. 28 Fed. App'x 392 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 3-4.
Compare BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 3 (contending that indirect auto lenders are liable for
discriminatory impact, if it set policies that allowed discriminatory impact to occur), with
Br. for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Cason v. Nissan Motor
Acceptance Corp., 28 Fed. App'x at 392, available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/cason.pdf [hereinafter DOJ BriefJ (arguing that
Nissan should be liable for discrimination of a dealer because it was foreseeable that
discrimination would occur based on the policies the lender set).
169. DOJ Brief, supra note 168, at 392.
170. Id.
171. Chanin etal.,supra note 81, at 3-4.
172. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 4.
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B. Disparate Treatment Doctrine
Liability for discrimination under the disparate treatment
doctrine occurs when a creditor treats an applicant differently based on
a prohibited factor such as race or national origin.173  The disparate
treatment doctrine is not likely applicable to most lenders that allow
dealer participation markups because liability under the disparate
treatment theory requires the plaintiff prove that the lender had the
intent or motive to discriminate. 174 Since dealer participation is a
compensation method widely used in the auto-lending industry and
lenders essentially just set rates, it is not likely that intent or motive to
discriminate could be imputed onto a third-party lender for
discrimination occurring within a dealer-consumer transaction.' 75
Additionally, the burden of proof to establish liability under the theory
of disparate treatment likely is insurmountable in cases imputing
liability to third parties. 176
C. Disparate Impact Doctrine
Instead of relying on the disparate treatment doctrine, the CFPB
will most likely rely on the disparate impact doctrine, also known as the
"effects test."1" The CFPB vowed to root out unlawful practices that
are "fair in form but discriminatory in operation."l 78  Under the
173. 12 C.F.R. § 1002 Supp. I Sec. 1002.4(a)-1 (2013).
174. See Hogan et al., supra note 5, at 2.
175. See Tex. Dep't of Cnty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-55 (1981) (landmark
Supreme Court case establishing a burden of proof under disparate treatment doctrine that is
very hard to meet).
176. See id. (establishing that the CFPB would likely have to show that the lender relied
on a protected attribute of the consumer to set the interest rate and not any other lawful
attribute, such as the consumer's negotiation capabilities or commitment to the transaction).
177. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, BULL. No. 2012-04 (FAIR LENDING), LENDING
DISCRIMINATION (Apr. 18, 2012), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpbbulletinlending-discrimination.pdf
("Consistent with other federal supervisory and law enforcement agencies, the CFPB
reaffirms that the legal doctrine of disparate impact remains applicable as the Bureau
exercises its supervision and enforcement authority to enforce compliance with the ECOA
and Regulation B.").
178. Cordray Remarks, supra note 38 (quoting the United States Supreme Court). The
phrase "fair in form but discriminatory in operation" has been repeated by the Supreme
Court in its decisions finding impermissible disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86,92 (1973).
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disparate impact doctrine, a lender may be liable for facially neutral
practices or policies that result in discriminatory impacts, even if the
lender lacked intent to discriminate. 179
Private litigants and the DOJ began advancing the disparate
impact theory in the 1990s, but the theory is controversial.s 0 In 2011,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Magner v. Gallagher, a case
challenging the disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act of
2011.181 However, the DOJ pressured the appellant to withdraw the
petition for certiorari in a publicized quid pro quo exchange, which
required the appellant city to withdraw its housing discrimination case
before the Supreme Court in exchange for the DOJ's disinclination to
intervene in an unrelated False Claims Act case against the city.' 82
Some in the legal community have interpreted the DOJ's pressure on
the appellant to withdraw its appeal in Magner as indicating weakness
in the legal basis of the disparate impact theory.' 83 More recently, the
DOJ-CFPB settlement against Ally likely prevented another chance to
argue a case based on the disparate impact theory before the Court.184
The disparate impact theory of liability is also "recognized in
employment cases involving the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act," but each of these statutes makes it unlawful to "affect" the
opportunities of minorities or protected classes. 8 5 However, neither the
Fair Housing Act nor the ECOA includes "affect" in that context.' 86
179. See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (demonstrating that
courts have found employers liable for unintentional discrimination under facially neutral
policies).
180. Chanin et al.,supra note 81, at 1.
181. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (showing that the Supreme Court granted cert).
182. See generally Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d at 823 (8th Cir. 2010) (showing the
arguments presented in the case challenging the disparate impact and disparate treatment
doctrines under the Fair Housing Act); see also Sari Horwitz, Four Republican Lawmakers
Accuse Justice Department of Inappropriate Quid Pro Quo, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.con/world/national-security/for-republican-
lawmakers-accuse-justice-department-of-inappropriate-quid-pro-quo/2012/09/27/61eaebl 6-
08e8-l le2-al Oc-fa5a255a9258 story.html.
183. Edwards & Loeser, supra note 162.
184. See Settlement Press Release, supra note 88, at 1-2; see also Joint Enforcement
Announcement, supra note 5.
185. See I Joseph G. Cook & John L. Sobieski, Jr, DISPARATE IMPACT IN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS 21.23 (Matthew Bender & Co., 2013); 8 Donald Resseguie, CIVIL LIABILITY IN
BANKING LAW § 161.04 (Matthew Bender Co., 2013); see also Edwards & Loeser, supra
note 162.
186. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)
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The disparate impact doctrine considers only a discriminatory result.' 87
If the statute, in this case the ECOA, does not prohibit the affecting of
opportunities for minorities, it is questionable whether such a results-
based doctrine can impose liability under the ECOA.'
In June 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another
case testing the disparate impact theory, Mt. Holly Garden Citizens in
Action v. Mt. Holly.'89 Once again, however, before the case was heard,
the parties settled out of court. 190 Mt. Holly Garden Citizens was a Fair
Housing Act case in which the Court could have decided whether
African-American and Hispanic residents were disproportionately
affected by a facially neutral redevelopment plan. 91 The Mt. Holly
Garden Citizens case represents the most recent opportunity for the
Court to confront the question of whether disparate impact theory will
survive judicial scrutiny.192 As a result, the credibility of the disparate
impact theory and the liability of indirect lenders under that theory
remain uncertain. 193
(showing the express use of "affect" in defining discrimination), and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (showing the express use of "affect" in
defining discrimination), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(showing the express use of "affect" in defining discrimination), with Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604-06 (showing no use of "affect" in defining discrimination), and
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (showing no use of "affect" in defining
discrimination).
187. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 583 (2009) (demonstrating that courts have
found employers liable for unintentional discrimination under facially neutral policies).
188. See Edwards & Loeser, supra note 162; see generally Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228 (2005) (discussing an employment discrimination case expounding on
disparate impact theory and narrowly construing its application, so that it may also apply
against the ECOA).
189. See generally Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658
F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011).
190. See Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
636 (2013) (dismissing the case); see also Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc., THE OYEZ PROJECT AT 1IT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF
LAW, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_11_.1507 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014)
(stating that the case was dismissed because the parties settled out of court).
191. See generally Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, 658 F.3d at 375 (giving the
theory of the case before it was dismissed); see also Heather Anderson, Regulators Ramping
Up Fair Lending Enforcement, CREDIT UNION TIMES Sept. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.cutimes.com/2013/09/09/regulators-ramping-up-fair-lending-
enforcement?t-washington&page=3.
192. See generally Twp. of Mt. Holly, 134 S. Ct. at 636.
193. See Chanin et al., supra note 8 1, at 3.
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D. Affirmative Defense to Disparate Impact Enforcement Efforts
Even if the disparate impact theory is legitimate, there is an
affirmative defense to charges brought under the theory-a showing of
a legitimate business need.194 Any potential disparate impact should be
weighed against the lender's legitimate business need for its dealer
compensation policy.'9 5 If lenders can raise a legitimate business need
as a defense to claims arising under the disparate impact theory, the
burden shifts to the CFPB to establish that there is another way to
achieve the legitimate business need without the disparate impact that
the lender refused to adopt.196
V. IMPACT ON THE MARKET
Before the Bulletin's issuance, many viewed the dealer
participation lending practice as a win-win for dealers and
consumers.197  In the dealer-assisted financing model, the consumer
benefits from numerous lenders competing for the same business.' 9 8
Even after dealer markups, dealer-assisted loans usually cost the
consumer about one percent less than direct loans through the lender.199
In addition to decreased costs through lender competition, the dealer-
assisted model allows dealers to negotiate on two separate levels:
purchase price and loan rate.200 If dealers can mark up interest rates that
have been driven down by lender competition, they have more
194. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 supp. I § 1002.6(a)(2) (2013); see also Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) ("Though we have phrased the query differently
in different cases, it is generally well established that at the justification stage of such a
disparate-impact case, the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.").
195. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002 supp. I § 1002.6(a)(2) ("The Act and regulation may
prohibit a creditor practice that is discriminatory in effect because it has a disproportionately
negative impact on a prohibited basis, even though the creditor has no intent to discriminate
and the practice appears neutral on its face, unless the creditor practice meets a legitimate
business need that cannot reasonably be achieved as well by means that are less disparate in
their impact.").
196. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 624 (2009) (holding that the burden shifts to the
complainant when a defendant shows a legitimate business need).
197. See Ira Silver, CFPB Targets Perceived Disparity in Dealer-Assisted Financing,
WARDSAUTO (Aug. 16, 2013), http://wardsauto.com/industry-voices/cfpb-targets-perceived-
disparity-dealer-assisted-financing.
198. See id.
199. Willis, supra note 164.
200. See id.
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flexibility to offer a lower purchase price to the consumer in order to
close the sale. 201 Regardless of the Bulletin, if dealer discretion in
markups is eliminated, dealers will continue to exercise discretion in
negotiating purchase prices because the CFPB does not have the
authority to directly regulate auto dealers.202 If dealers lose negotiation
power over interest rates, they are less likely to offer lower purchase
prices because they will not have any way to offset that loss over the
course of the transaction.203
Additionally, the Bulletin introduces confusion and
impediments to competition that may lead to higher loan prices for all
consumers. 204 Since lenders under the CFPB's jurisdiction are subject
to a legally uncertain standard, the safest way for lenders to proceed is
to follow the CFPB's guidance.205 The Bulletin suggests that lenders
impose controls on dealer discretion, or more simply, eliminate dealer
discretion altogether.206 As lenders comply with the Bulletin to varying
degrees at varying speeds, auto dealers may choose to work with
lenders allowing the highest dealer compensation rates or those that
allow dealer discretion.207
Moreover, the Bulletin recommendations incorporate increased
expenses for lenders retaining dealer discretion that will likely pass to
consumers. 208 Lenders are required to police any dealer discretion they
201. See id.
202. See 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a) (excluding auto dealers from CFPB jurisdiction); see also
id.
203. See Willis, supra note 164 ("If dealers are forced to accept less compensation for
originating retail installment contracts, there is no reason to believe that they will simply
absorb the loss; it is more likely that they will become less generous in discounting the
prices of automobiles they sell.").
204. See Rachel Witkowski, Car Dealers Fight Back Against CFPB Auto Financing
Rule, AM. BANKER (Mar. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_57/car-dealers-fight-back-against-cfpb-auto-
financing-rule-1057779-1.html.
205. See Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 3.
206. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 4.
207. See Foster et al., supra note 92, at 2 ("As lenders move at varying speeds, or not at
all, toward eliminating discretionary pricing, auto dealers will - as a result of operational
realities - congregate to lenders who leave their policy unchanged and competition for auto
dealer paper will suffer. In theory, lenders who have eliminated auto dealer interest rate
pricing discretion will have to raise their auto dealer compensation across the board if they
wish to remain competitive. If things unfold in this way, the unintended consequence of the
CFPB's policy on indirect auto lending will be to effect an overall increase in the cost of
financing a vehicle through an auto dealer.").
208. Willis, supra note 164.
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allow under the threat of CFPB enforcement action.209 Recommended
compliance measures include monitoring and statistical analyses of both
lender and dealer-specific portfolios. These measures will be especially
expensive for larger lenders that maintain relationships with thousands
of auto dealers. 2 10 Finally, it can be expected that the costs associated
with the defense of any CFPB action against lenders will also be passed
on to consumers.2 11
A possible impact of the distortion in competition resulting from
inconsistent enforcement, compliance, and adoption of the various
CFPB-approved alternatives is that the cost of auto financing through
dealers will increase, harming the consumer in the long run.212 Still, the
CFPB deemed conducting a cost-benefit analysis that would weigh the
effects of the Bulletin's recommendations, "not appropriate" because it
was not required.213
This grim outlook concerns only costs associated with
compliance and assumes all lenders are subject to the same degree of
214enforcement. This may not be the case under current CFPB
jurisdiction.215 The Bulletin's guidance contradicts remarks from
Director Cordray that the CFPB intends to create a level playing field
for market participants.216 Small bank lenders not subject to the
CFPB's guidance may continue to exercise discretion and maximize
value from each lending transaction.217 Encumbered with the Bulletin,
non-excluded lenders may struggle to compete not only amongst
themselves, but also with these smaller excluded lenders.
209. BULLETIN, supra note 2, at 4-5.
210. See Willis, supra note 164.
211. See id.; see, e.g., Settlement Press Release, supra note 88.
212. See Foster et al., supra note 92, at 2; see also supra notes 203-11 and
accompanying text.
213. Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 5.
214. See Foster et al., supra note 92, at 2.
215. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d) (2012) (showing that the CFPB is limited in its
authority over smaller lenders).
216. Chanin et al., supra note 81, at 1; Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Protection
Bureau, Prepared Remarks at the Clearing House Annual Conference (Nov. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/director-cordray-remarks-at-the-
clearing-house-annual-conference/.
217. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d) (limiting the CFPB's jurisdiction over small lenders with
assets less than $10 billion).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The CFPB is acting zealously in pursuit of a worthy goal: the
prevention of discrimination.218 It is not clear, however, that there is
compelling evidence of discrimination in the auto loan industry. 219 in
their regulatory fervor, the CFPB may negatively impact the auto loan
market, which, as discussed above, was expressly excluded from the
CFPB's purview. 220
The Bulletin lacks a solid legal foundation, transparency,
adequate data, and legislative support.22 1 Though its transparency has
been somewhat bolstered in subsequent remarks and letters from the
CFPB,222 this increased transparency reveals that the CFPB refuses to
acknowledge any change in the understanding of the ECOA
implemented by its Bulletin.22 3 For that reason, the CFPB will not
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of its guidance.224 As a result, those
impacted by the guidance, including consumers, will have to wait and
see what the effects will be.
Nevertheless, as undesirable as the CFPB's methods of
implementing new requirements are, they are effective. 225  The CFPB
may greatly reduce the prevalence of dealer markup compensation in
the United States by holding the largest auto lenders to standards they
cannot possibly work around.226 Nine months after the Bulletin was
issued, Ally paid the third largest settlement in DOJ history.227
Although Ally may not have had much warning, other indirect auto
lenders certainly do after news of the settlement.228 Aside from wanting
to avoid enormous settlements, it seems unlikely that major lenders will
want to publicly defend against discrimination charges brought by the
218. Chanin et al.,supra note 81, at 1.
219. See Senate Letter, supra note 7 (asking for the CFPB's basis for its assertion that
discrimination exists in indirect auto lending).
220. See NADA Statement, supra note 7.
221. See generally Letter to Senators, supra note 55; Letter to Congress, supra note 60.
222. See generally Letter to Senators, supra note 55; Letter to Congress, supra note 60.
223. See Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 4-5; see also Letter to Congress, supra
note 60.
224. See Letter to Senators, supra note 55, at 4-5.
225. See Hogan et al., supra note 5; see also Settlement Press Release, supra note 88.
226. See Hogan et al., supra note 5.
227. See id.
228. See Settlement Press Release, supra note 88.
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CFPB. 229 The Center for Responsible Lending cites lack of awareness
and disclosure requirements about dealer markups as a problem.230
While the CFPB did not issue a formal rule to address public awareness
about dealer markups, the historically high settlement was publicized,
along with explanations about the compensation practice that Ally was
held liable for allowing. Therefore, the CFPB may be increasing public
awareness about dealer compensation.
However, the CFPB charged forward to change the status quo in
auto dealer compensation by ignoring the previous understanding of the
ECOA, the limitations on its jurisdiction, the merits of cost-benefit
analysis, and the other checks of the APA and Dodd-Frank.231 The
drawbacks and weaknesses to the CFPB's pace and disregard for
rulemaking and its own limitations call the prudence of the Bulletin into
23question.232 In attempting to rescue consumers by moving quickly to
enact widespread change, the CFPB may be well on its way to impeding
an efficient consumer auto loan market and sacrificing competitive
loans for the very consumers it seeks to protect.233
KIM B. PEREZ
229. See id.; see also Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc.,
2013 U.S. LEXIS 8414 (U.S. 2013) (demonstrating the most recent case to settle on
discrimination claims rather than test a theory of liability that has remained unchallenged at
the Supreme Court for over 30 years, despite a grant of certiorari by the Court).
230. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 32, at 4.
231. See supra Part III.
232. See id.
233. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (The purpose of the CFPB includes ensuring that "markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.").
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